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Cost-Benefit Analysis and the
Negligence Standard
Stephen R. Perry*
In his commentary on the proposed Restatement (Third) of
Torts: General Principles (Discussion Draft) ("Discussion Draft"), 1
Stephen Gilles does an excellent job of analyzing the role of costbenefit analysis in the characterization of reasonable care in previous restatements, and also of tracing the relationship between that
characterization and contemporaneous scholarly work. 2 This is a
necessary prelude to any attempt to reformulate the content of the
negligence standard in a Restatement (Third), and I think that
Gilles' work will prove to be exceptionally helpful in that regard.
Given the limited space I have available for my own comments,
however, I intend to focus, somewhat more narrowly, on the Discussion Draft itself, and on Gilles' direct critique of some of its provisions.
Let me begin with the proposed definition of negligence in
Section 4 of the Discussion Draft. An actor is negligent, we are told,
if he or she "does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances."3 The Section then goes on to state the following:
Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether conduct lacks reasonable care
are the foreseeable likelihood that it will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of

the harm that may ensue, and the burden that would be borne by the actor and
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others4 if the actor takes precautions that eliminate or reduce the possibility of
harm.

As Gilles points out, these are essentially the factors that figure in
the Learned Hand formula 5 and, indeed, in the understanding of
reasonable care that informs the Restatements (First)and (Second).6
As Gilles further points out, the Discussion Draft differs from the
first two Restatements in that it does not make either the Hand factors, or the Learned Hand formula itself, subordinate in any way to
the traditional concept of the reasonable person. Rather, the Discussion Draft drops the reasonable person from the main text and
7
mentions the idea only in passing, in the comments.
I will return to the reasonable person later. For the moment,
I wish to focus on the Discussion Draft's explanation for what it
variously terms a cost-benefit test, a risk-benefit test, and a balancing approach.8 In Comment d on Section 4, the Discussion Draft
states that the balancing approach rests on "the simple idea" that
"[c]onduct is negligent if its disadvantages exceed its advantages,
while [it] is not negligent if its advantages exceed its disadvantages."9 The comment then explains that this means that conduct is
negligent if the magnitude of the associated risk exceeds the burden
of risk precaution, where the magnitude of the risk is understood as
including both the likelihood and foreseeable severity of harm.
This, of course, sounds very much like the Learned Hand
formula without the algebra. More generally, it sounds like a
straightforward consequentialist understanding of the standard of
reasonable care, which is certainly how Gilles seems to understand
it.1 ° As Gilles points out, however, there are various versions of a
consequentialist approach-one can ask, for example, whether the
appropriate metric is utility or wealth-and he makes the point
that if the Discussion Draft is going to go the consequentialist
route, there is something to be said for making clear which version
it takes to be the best one." The point I wish to emphasize is a dif-

4. Id.
5. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) C'[]f
the probability [of an accident] be called P; the injury [occasioned by the accident], L; and tho
burden (of preventing the accident], B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.").
6.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-93 (1965); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS

§§ 291-93 (1934).
7. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 4 cmt. a.
8. Id. § 4 cmt. d.
9. Id.
10. Gilles, supranote 2,at 820-21.
11. See id. at 819, 820-21.
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ferent one, however. It concerns the propriety of adopting a costbenefit or balancing approach as the primary understanding of the
standard of reasonable care in the first place. There are a number
of aspects to this more general question. First, from a positive point
of view, it is not obvious that a pure cost-benefit approach corresponds very well to the law. As Gilles observes,1 2 even the Restatements (First)and (Second), despite a heavy emphasis on risk-utility
reasoning, still gave ultimate pride of place to the reasonable person.' 3 Furthermore, Bohlen's apparent attempt to nudge courts towards more explicit Learned-Hand-type jury charges 14 has not been
particularly successful. So far as case law is concerned, there are
many appellate opinions stating that the magnitude of the risk and
the cost of preventative precautions are factors that are relevant to
the determination of whether or not the actor was negligent. But
the number of opinions which explicitly state that negligence just is
a matter of costs exceeding benefits are relatively few.
The fact that the law is unclear in this area is not by itself a
bar to adopting cost-benefit analysis as the fundamental characteristic of the negligence standard, since it is sometimes appropriate for restatements to take a normative stand. But one would expect the rationale for any such normative move to be clearly articulated in the proposed Restatement (Third)'s comments, particularly when the issue is as controversial as this one. Unfortunately,
that is not true of the Discussion Draft.
I said earlier that the text of Section 4 of the Discussion
Draft, together with its elaboration in Comment d, appearsto adopt
a thoroughgoing consequentialist approach to defining negligence.
In fact it is not possible to conclude that a norm calling for, say, the
maximization of wealth or utility is in fact best understood as consequentialist in character, without first examining the justification
that is being offered for that norm. This point is well-illustrated by
Gilles' list of various interpretations of the Learned Hand test, 5
which includes, among others, Ronald Dworkin's egalitarian approach. 16 Dworkin's account of the negligence standard is meant to
be a refinement of a non-consequentialist, abstractly egalitarian
theory of distributive justice. The mere fact that this refinement

12. Id. at 821-22.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 283, 285 (1965); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
§§ 291-93 (1934).
14. See Gilles, supra note 2, at 838-39 (discussing Bohlen's Commentary on RESrATMEN
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 172 (Tentative Draft No. 4 1929)).
15. See id. at 819-20.
16. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 276-312 (1986).
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adopts a comparative-harm test, which, in Dworkin's elaboration of
it, amounts to a wealth-maximizing version of Learned Hand, does
not show that the theory is not best understood as nonconsequentialist in character.
The Discussion Draft seems to have absorbed this lesson in
Comment j on Section 4, entitled "Rationales for negligence liability."'17 The first rationale that it offers for the claim that the negligence standard should be understood solely in cost-benefit terms is
said to be "fairness," and, in the Reporter's Note, this is further
characterized as a "corrective justice approach."'18 The heart of the
argument in Comment j then runs as follows:
The defendant who permits conduct to impose on others a risk of harm that exceeds the burden the defendant would bear in avoiding that risk is evidently a
party who ranks personal interests or welfare ahead of the interests or welfare of
others. This conduct violates the ethical norm of equal consideration, and a tort
award seeks to remedy this violation.' 9

While I think the proposed Discussion Draft is right to attempt to
justify the negligence standard in non-consequentialist terms, this
particular argument is weak. Arguments along similar lines have
been offered by corrective justice theorists in the past, and they
have almost always been abandoned. 20 The argument is subject to a
number of difficulties, not the least of which is the problematic idea
that treating interests equally amounts to treating persons equally.
After all, if you impose a cost-justified risk on someone else, you get
to keep the benefits of the action while the other person incurs the
costs. That does not look very much like the application of a norm of
equal consideration. Perhaps fairness-and I use that term, rather
than a term such as equal treatment, advisedly-requires that an
agent take at least the same precautions with respect to another's
interest as she would take with respect to her own, but it hardly
follows that she need take no more than that level of precaution.
The argument in comment j thus does not justify an understanding of reasonable care that is spelled out solely in cost-benefit

17. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 4 cmt. j.
18. Id. § 4 Reporter's Note.
19. Id. § 4 cmt. j.
20. Consider, for example, Ernest Weinrib's early claim that a person whose actions affected
only himself would apply the Learned Hand test to his own interests, and "[iut would be a violation of equality for the the defendant to refuse to extend to the plaintiff the consideration that he
would have extended to himself." Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law,
2 LAW & PHIL. 37, 53 (1983). Weinrib criticizes the Learned Hand test (albeit without acknowledging his early championing of it) in ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 147-48
(1995).
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terms. Ronald Dworkin, as I noted earlier, has also advanced a nonconsequentialist argument in support of a cost-benefit approach to
negligence, and while it is not a matter I can pursue here, there are
good reasons for thinking that that argument is not ultimately successful either. 21 In any event, Dworkin does not advocate an understanding of negligence that is delineated purely in cost-benefit
terms. He places various restrictions on his comparative harm test,
such as that it should not encroach on individual rights that protect
22
fundamental interests.

The "equal consideration" argument that the Discussion
Draft deploys in support of a thoroughgoing cost-benefit characterization of negligence thus cannot do the work that is being asked of
it, and, so far as I am aware, there is no other non-consequentialist
argument that can. This does not mean, however, that a nonconsequentialist understanding of the negligence standard would
never countenance Hand-style balancing. It seems to me that a
plausible non-consequentialist account would, for reasons having to
do with autonomy and reciprocity among persons, call for a weighing of costs and benefits in a large range of circumstances, as, for
example, when the relevant risks are common and/or relatively low
in magnitude. 23 But an understanding of negligence that permitted
one person unilaterally to impose substantial risks on others simply
because the costs of prevention were too high is very unlikely to be
acceptable from a non-consequentialist perspective. 24
Of course, the Discussion Draft also offers a second rationale
for its characterization of reasonable care in thoroughgoing costbenefit terms: adopting such a characterization gives people safety
incentives that will improve social welfare and advance economic
goals. 25 This is a standard consequentialist understanding of negligence law, and the associated economic model is a familiar one.
This is not the time to review the many powerful critiques that
have been offered of that model, so it will have to suffice for present
purposes to say that there are good reasons to think that, at the
very least, the economic picture of negligence law is not a complete
21. See Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between Corrective and DistributiveJustice,
in OxFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 237, 247-53 (Jeremy Harder ed., Series No. 4, 2000).

22. DWORIUN, supranote 16, at 307, 309.
23. For additional discussion, see Stephen P, Perry, The DistributiveTurn: Mischief, Misfortune and Tort Law, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYs IN LEGAL THEORY 141, 157.61 (Brian Bix
ed., 1998); Stephen K. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in
PHILOSOPHY AND TORT LAW (Gerald Postema ed., forthcoming) [hereinafter Perry, Responsibility].
24. See Perry, Responsibility, supranote 23.
25. Discussion Draft, supra note 1, § 4 cmt j.
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one and that the Discussion Draft is correct to view the negligence
standard at least partly in non-consequentialist terms. But there is
no reason to think that an appropriate non-consequentialist understanding of negligence law will converge with the economic understanding. Appealing as such an outcome would surely be, it is unfortunately not available.
In light of this, there are a number of courses that a new
Restatement could take. One would simply be to bite the bullet and
embrace a particular, detailed, theoretical approach to negligence
law. It would be all too easy to go the economic route, but, as I have
suggested, that would be true neither to the case law nor to the underlying normative principles. It would be extremely daring to take
a purely non-consequentialist approach, and while, in my view,
truth lies more in that direction than in the other, in the end I
think that that, too, would be a mistake. The views of corrective
justice theorists diverge quite widely on the issue of how properly to
formulate the standard of care, and it is not the job of a restatement to embrace highly controversial theoretical views.
There is another possibility, however, and that is to retain
the reasonable person idea as the primary expression of the negligence standard. This is, after all, one of the most deeply entrenched
concepts in negligence law. Here I agree with Gilles, although for
quite different reasons from the ones he gives. Reasonableness is
the most general expression of the fundamental idea that we have
certain moral obligations to others that do not depend on consequentialist calculations, but derive, rather, from independent principles of reciprocity and cooperation. 26 It is therefore no accident, in
my view, that the concept is as deeply embedded in tort law as it is.
That having been said, it is of course true that the reasonable person idea has been given consequentialist as well as nonconsequentialist interpretations. It would be appropriate to discuss
these differing interpretations in a new Restatement, particularly in
the comments. It is to the credit of the Discussion Draft that it does
not ignore the existence of fundamentally different theoretical
views about the nature of tort law in general, and the content of the
negligence standard in particular. But the Discussion Draft goes
wrong in assuming that those different views all converge on a costbenefit understanding of reasonable care. They do not. They do,
however, have a common starting-point, and that is the notion of

26.

See JOHN RAWLS, POLITIcAL LIBERALISM 300, 305-06 (The John Dewey Essays in Phi-

losophy No. 4, 1993).
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the reasonable person. It is that notion, and not cost-benefit analysis, that should be at the core of the new Restatement's characterization of the negligence standard.

